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THE MARRIAGE PROTECTION ACT:
A LESSON IN CONGRESSIONAL OVER-REACHING
SARAH KROLL-ROSENBAUM*
Q. Let’s stop beating around the bush and get to the central ques-
tion.  The bald truth is this, isn’t it, that the power to regulate
jurisdiction is actually a power to regulate rights – rights to judi-
cial process, whatever those are, and substantive rights generally?
Why, that must be so.  What can a court do if Congress says it
has no jurisdiction, or only a restricted jurisdiction?  It’s helpless
– helpless even to consider the validity of the limitation, let alone
to do anything about it if it’s invalid.
A. Why, what monstrous illogic!  To build up a mere power to
regulate jurisdiction into a power to affect rights having nothing
to do with jurisdiction!  And into a power to do it in contradic-
tion to all the other terms of the very document which confers the
power to regulate jurisdiction!
Q. Will you please explain what’s wrong with the logic?
A. What’s wrong, for one thing, is that it violates a necessary
postulate of constitutional government – that a court must al-
ways be available to pass on claims of constitutional right to judi-
cial process, and to provide much process if the claim is
sustained.
Q. Whose Constitution are you talking about – Utopia’s or ours?
A. Ours. It’s a perfectly good Constitution if we know how to
interpret it.1
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 2004, the U. S. House of Representatives approved
the Marriage Protection Act of 2004 (MPA).2  The MPA would pro-
* Law Clerk, The Honorable Christopher F. Droney, U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut, 2005-2006.  J.D., New York Law School, 2005.
1. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1371-72 (1953).
2. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004) (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Sept. 7, 2004).
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hibit the lower federal courts from hearing any issue regarding the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),3 and would also prevent the Su-
preme Court from hearing any related cases on appeal from federal
or state courts.4  Although the MPA never reached the Senate floor
last session, it is still under consideration.  An identical bill, this one
with seventy sponsors, was introduced in the House in 2005.5
The jurisdiction-limiting provisions of the MPA come at a time
when issues of same-sex marriage are controversial in both public
and private fora.  In 2004, eleven states amended their constitutions
in various ways to deny legal recognition of gay and lesbian relation-
ships.6  The rights of same-sex couples are being litigated and legis-
lated across America in response to the legal issues that face all
couples: taxes, adoption, child support, hospital visitation rights,
and inheritance.7
3. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
4. At the time of this writing, the Senate had not yet acted on the House’s bill.
5. Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (2005).
6. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, A Victory for “Values,” but Whose?, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
2004, at C01 (“[Eleven] states offered voters a chance to ban gay marriage, and in every
state they did so.”); Sarah Kershaw, Constitutional Bans on Same-Sex Marriage Gain Wide-
spread Support in Ten States, NY TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at P9 (noting that ballot initiatives
passed in 10 of 11 states to amend the state constitution to define marriage as between
only a man and a woman). See also Susan Wang, Marriage Protection Act Reintroduced in the
House, CHRISTIAN POST, Mar. 5, 2005, http://www.christianpost.com/article/society/
1424/section/marriage.protection.act.reintroduced.in.house./1.htm (noting that since
the passage of the MPA last year by the House, 13 states have approved marriage
amendments to their state constitutions).  For more information about the 2004 ballot
initiatives, see http://www.hrc.org.
7. See, e.g., Camille M. Quinn & Shawna S. Baker, The Legislative Backlash to Ad-
vances in Rights for Same-Sex Couples: Essential Estate Planning for the Constitutionally Unrecog-
nized Families in Oklahoma: Same-Sex Couples, 40 TULSA L. REV. 479 (2005) (discussing the
legal hardships facing same-sex couples in estate planning); Neal S. Schelberg & Carrie
L. Mitnick, Same-Sex Marriage: The Evolving Landscape for Employee Benefits, 22 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65 (2004) (same for employee benefits); Recent Case: Family Law –
Unmarried Couples – Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Holds That a Former Domestic Part-
ner Need Not Fulfill Promises To Support a Child After the Relationship has Resolved: T.F. v.
B.L., 118 HARV. L. REV. 1039 (2005) (highlighting a case in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Court denied an unmarried, same-sex couple the ability to establish
parenthood by contract alone and refused to order financial support for a child born
after the couple’s relationship had dissolved).  For coverage of the myriad collateral
legal issues for gay and lesbian couples, see Lesbian/Gay Law Notes (The Lesbian and Gay
Law Ass’n of Greater New York, New York, N.Y.), http://www.nyls.edu/pages/3876.asp
(last visited, Feb. 25, 2006).
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By passing a bill that strips the federal courts of the authority to
hear certain cases, Congress has invoked its constitutional authority
over the judiciary.  Congress has done so before, at other moments
in American history when political tensions ran high, in a manner
that some have criticized as a threat to separation of powers.8  The
MPA raises questions about whether Congress would act within its
constitutional authority by precluding gay and lesbian couples, and
those affected by their marriages, from seeking review in the fed-
eral courts, and specifically, whether Congress may simultaneously
restrict the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  No prior piece of leg-
islation has raised these issues, nor has the Court definitively deter-
mined whether Congress may simultaneously restrict original
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.9
This Note considers whether the MPA is a constitutional exer-
cise of Congress’s authority over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.  Section II examines the MPA and also DOMA, the underly-
ing statute that could not be challenged in federal court under the
8. See Anthony Lewis, An Independent Judiciary, 43 ST. LOUIS L.J. 285, 290-92
(1999) (arguing that the court stripping of the mid-1990s passed with little scrutiny
from the Executive, and that such success in Congress may lead to its future use as a
means of political reform).  In 2004, for example, numerous bills were introduced by
members of Congress that would restrict the original jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over a variety of issues. See,
e.g., Fairness in Immigration Litigation Act, H.R. 4406, 108th Cong. (as referred to the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, May 5, 2004); Pledge of Allegiance Protection Act (PPA),
H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (as received in the Senate, Sept. 27, 2004).  Each term, many
such bills are introduced.  In the 1980s thirty bills stripping federal courts of jurisdic-
tion were introduced in Congress.  Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984).
See Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional Control Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A New
Threat to James Madison’s Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417, 435 (2000) (noting that none
of the jurisdiction stripping bills of the 1980s passed Congress).  What is different now
is that court stripping bills are passing.  In 2004 two bills passed the house.  The MPA of
2004 passed by a margin of 233-194. See 150 CONG. REC. H6612 (daily ed. Jul. 22, 2004).
And the PPA passed by a margin of 247-173. See 150 CONG. REC. H7478 (daily ed. Sept.
23, 2004).
9. See John Conyers, Jr., Stealing Judicial Review: House Bill Stripping Federal Courts of
Jurisdiction Over Gay Marriage Harms Constitution, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at 38 (“If
H.R. 3313 is passed by the Senate and signed by the president, it would constitute the
first and only time that Congress has enacted legislation totally eliminating any federal
court from considering federal legislation.”).
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MPA.  Section II analyzes the language of the two statutes and ex-
plains why DOMA does not appear to add anything to existing law.
It also contends that the MPA would probably not bar federal
courts from hearing all marriage-related claims of same-sex
couples.  Section III argues that Congress does not have the consti-
tutional authority to simultaneously strip both the original jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over DOMA-related cases or controversies because
constitutional rights are at stake.  This Note concludes in Section IV
that the MPA is unconstitutional because it precludes all federal
courts from reviewing cases that raise constitutional questions.
II. UNDERSTANDING DOMA AND THE MPA
DOMA was passed by Congress in 1996 with overwhelming ma-
jorities in both houses.10  The statute expressed the intention of
Congress that the Full Faith and Credit Clause should not prevent
states from determining whether or not to recognize same-sex mar-
riages from other states.11  DOMA provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, ter-
ritory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship be-
tween persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
10. DOMA passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 342-67. See 142 CONG.
REC. H7505 (daily ed. Jul. 13, 1996).  DOMA was approved by the Senate by a vote of 85-
14. See 142 CONG. REC. S10129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996).
11. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).  The implementing stat-
ute for the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), states:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State . . .
shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States . . .
together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is
in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken.
DOMA also amended the federal code to define “marriage” for recognition under fed-
eral administrative and statutory law as exclusively being between people of opposite
sexes. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
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possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.12
Eight years later, the House of Representatives Committee on
the Judiciary endorsed the MPA and sent it to the floor where it was
passed by the House of Representatives.  Some advocates called the
passage of the MPA a right-wing backlash against the Senate’s rejec-
tion of the Federal Marriage Amendment.13  While the passage of
the MPA appears unlikely in early 2006, the constitutional implica-
tions are worth considering, if only to understand the implications
for Congress’s next attempt to restrict access to the courts.  Accord-
ing to the Judiciary Committee report, the MPA stands for “the pro-
position that lifetime-appointed Federal judges must not be allowed
to rewrite marriage policy for the states.”14  The language of the
MPA, as passed by the House of Representatives, provides that:
No court created by Act of Congress shall have any juris-
diction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate
jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to
the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitu-
tion of, section 1738C [the Defense of Marriage Act] or
this section.15
By preventing the federal judiciary from considering DOMA claims,
Congress would prevent states from being forced to acknowledge
any other state’s recognition of same-sex marriage.  The House
Committee on the Judiciary stated that “Congress must preclude
Federal courts from striking down the shield Congress gave the
states before Federal courts strike down that protection and set ad-
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
13. Right-Wing’s Discriminatory Electoral Strategy Takes New Tack, http://www.
pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=16497 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006). The Fed-
eral Marriage Amendment would have amended the U.S. Constitution to state that:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be con-
ferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.
The Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. RES. 40, 108th Cong. (2004).  On July 14, 2004,
by a vote of 48-50, the Senate narrowly defeated the proposed amendment. Id.
14. H.R. REP. NO. 108-614, at 2 (2004).
15. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
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verse judicial precedents that have effects across multiple states and
cannot be reversed.”16
In order to appreciate the arguments about the constitutional-
ity of the MPA, it is necessary to understand what that law and
DOMA do.  This section first explains why DOMA adds little to ex-
isting law regarding the recognition of out-of-state same-sex mar-
riages, and then examines why the MPA was proposed to insulate
DOMA from review in the federal courts.  Finally, the section con-
tends that, despite the intentions of the MPA’s sponsors, the law
would not be entirely preclusive of a federal court’s jurisdiction to
hear all state and federal claims resulting from the state’s refusal to
recognize a same-sex marriage.
A. DOMA Adds Little to Existing Law Regarding the Recognition
of Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriages
Although DOMA conferred broad discretion on the states to
determine when to recognize out-of-state, same-sex marriages, the
legislation did not significantly change the legal landscape of the
recognition of those marriages.17  As one commentator argued:
Marriage is a state-law matter.  Its boundaries have always
varied from state to state and thus reflect the varying pol-
icy choices of the states.  The drive to allow same-sex mar-
riage changes none of this, and efforts to invoke the Full
Faith and Credit Clause or any other constitutional provi-
sion to create a de facto federal standard are simply
unavailing.18
States have historically differed in their marriage laws and have
therefore been faced with questions of when and how to recognize
16. H.R. REP. NO. 108-614, at 4 (2004).
17. See MARK STRASSER, THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST PRINCI-
PLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 189 (1999) (stating that:
Those states “given” the option by DOMA to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages already have it and those states not having that option will not
have suddenly acquired it through DOMA.  Indeed, some interpret DOMA
not to be changing current law and, instead, merely to be reaffirming the
right of the domicile to refuse to recognize a marriage validly celebrated
elsewhere.).
18. Patrick J. Borchers, Interstate Recognition of Nontraditional Marriages, in MAR-
RIAGES AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 338 (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds., 2003).
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out-of-state marriages.19  Now, as was true before DOMA was en-
acted, one state has no obligation to recognize a marriage from an-
other state because marriage itself does not constitute a “judgment”
for the purposes of full faith and credit.20  Marriages, therefore, are
not subject to recognition by other states’ courts and legislatures.21
An out-of-state marriage is typically recognized if the marriage
is consistent with the policy of the recognizing state.22  For exam-
ple, a same-sex couple with a valid Massachusetts marriage that
moves to another state may face the likely scenario that its new state
has a formal policy — by statute or state constitutional amendment
— specifically barring recognition of other states’ same-sex mar-
riages.  Theoretically, “courts are free, absent some contrary direc-
tion from their state legislature, to recognize or not recognize
nontraditional marriages celebrated in other states.  DOMA, there-
fore, despite the furor over its enactment, is essentially a restate-
ment of what the law would be without it.”23
19. Id. at 336.  As Professor Borchers suggests, “choice-of-law questions surround-
ing nontraditional marriages have been around for a long time and persist today.” Id.
For examples of varied state marriage laws, see STRASSER, supra note 17, at 112-13.
20. See Borchers, supra note 18, at 335 (“A marriage license simply is not a ‘judg-
ment’ for constitutional purposes, and the full-faith-and-credit principles regarding
judgment recognition impose no obligation on states to recognize each other’s
marriages.”).
21. Although marriage is not a judgment for purposes of full-faith-and-credit,
complexity may nevertheless ensue with the collateral implications of marriage.  Some
scholars argue, for example, that divorce proceedings and decrees are judgments for
full-faith-and-credit purposes. Id. at 334.
22. Borchers, supra note 18, at 335-36. See also STRASSER, supra note 17, at 113
(“[T]here is a generally accepted decision rule for determining which law to apply.
The law of the place of celebration will apply unless the marriage violates an important
public policy of the domicile, in which case the domicile’s law will apply and the mar-
riage will be invalid.”). THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 283
(1971), states in relevant part:
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in
§ 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the mar-
riage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates
the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.
23. Borchers, supra note 18, at 332.
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B. The MPA Responds to the Fear that the Federal Courts will
Declare DOMA Unconstitutional
The MPA is necessary, according to its drafters, to safeguard
the rights of states to independently define marriage policy.  The
MPA sponsors were concerned that “[f]ederal judges are poised to
overturn state marriage laws that rest on the principle that marriage
is the union of one man and one woman.”24  The evidence cited to
support such an imminent threat to state marriage laws, however, is
sparse.  Nearly every state has some provision that defines marriage
in opposite-sex terms.25  The case law supporting a fundamental
right to marry — as it relates to opposite sex couples — is routinely
couched in terms of state supremacy in all matters involving mar-
riage law.  For example, Justice Marshall wrote in his majority opin-
ion in Zablocki v. Redhail:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to
marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regula-
tion which relates in any way to the incidents of or prereq-
uisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous
scrutiny.  To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do
not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.26
Despite federal deference to state marriage policy, proponents of
the MPA felt it necessary to prevent any possibility that a federal
court would unilaterally uproot the states’ prerogative over mar-
riage policy.  The House Committee on the Judiciary wrote:
Congress must exercise its constitutional authority to limit
the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to ensure that the
states, and not unelected Federal judges, have the final
say on whether they must accept same-sex marriage li-
censes issued in other states.  Congress must preclude
Federal courts from striking down the shield Congress
gave the states to use in rejecting same-sex marriage li-
censes granted in other states before Federal courts strike
24. H.R. REP. NO. 108-614, at 3 (2004).
25. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2005);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 551.1 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3101.01 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 765.01 (2005).
26. 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
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down that protection and set adverse judicial precedents
that have effects across multiple states and cannot be
reversed.27
This preclusion of federal judicial power does not, the drafters
contend, violate the separation of powers: “Congress’s exercise of
its authority to remove classes of cases from Federal court jurisdic-
tion does not transfer power from the Federal judiciary to Con-
gress.  Rather, it transfers power from the Federal judiciary to the
state judiciary.”28  The MPA therefore simultaneously insulates fed-
erally-enacted DOMA and devolves decisionmaking power to the
states.29
C. The MPA Would Not Bar Federal Courts From Hearing all
Marriage-Related Claims of Same-Sex Couples
The MPA would not preclude federal court review of all same-
sex marriage challenges. In this respect, the MPA does not mirror
the breadth of its legislative cousins in precluding federal judicial
review of all issues related to a particular controversy.  The MPA is
limited to DOMA’s bar on full faith and credit considerations relat-
ing to state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, and more impor-
tantly, to interpretations of questions relating to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and to the MPA, or to either statute’s federal consti-
tutional validity.  The MPA does not, for example, preclude the
lower federal courts from hearing, or the Supreme Court from re-
viewing, cases or controversies relating to or arising from any state
or federal definition of marriage or civil union recognizing same-
27. H.R. REP. NO. 108-614, at 4 (2004).
28. Id. at 18.
29. Congress may be trying to have the best of two worlds.  As one commentator
has suggested, “A federal statute defining marriage as including or excluding same-sex
couples for all purposes nationwide would clearly be at odds with the limited national
legislative power feature of the federal component of ‘our’ system of government and,
for that reason, would likely be unconstitutional.”  Kevin J. Worthen, Who Decides and
What Difference Does it Make?: Defining Marriage in “Our Democratic, Federal Republic”, 18
BYU J. PUB. L. 273, 290 (2004).
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sex relationships.30  The MPA, therefore, would not preclude fed-
eral court review of all same-sex marriage challenges.31
The DOMA provision restricting full faith and credit for same-
sex marriages granted in other states would likely be invoked by a
state as a defense; it would be raised in response to a same-sex
couple’s petition to have their out-of-state marriage recognized.32
Federal courts, precluded by the MPA, would not be able to con-
sider the state’s DOMA defenses, but would nevertheless be able to
reach a plaintiff’s non-DOMA claims, as well as challenges to the
MPA itself.  Consider, for example, the scenario of a legally married
lesbian couple from Massachusetts who moves to Arizona and wants
to continue to enjoy the benefits of marriage.33  Arizona law specifi-
cally prohibits the legal recognition of marriages between people of
the same sex, and has a statute barring the recognition of same-sex
marriages from other jurisdictions.34  Under the language of the
MPA, the couple could bring a claim in federal court challenging
Arizona’s policy of recognizing only opposite-sex marriages, argu-
30. The choice of language may well have been an attempt to maintain facial neu-
trality in the face of subsequent constitutional scrutiny.
31. This assumes that a state would argue for the court to construe DOMA as it
relates to the situation.  Obviously, if DOMA is never raised as an argument against the
same-sex couple’s marriage claim, the MPA would never bar the litigation in federal
court.
32. See Vikram David Amar, The Marriage Protection Act Bill Passed by the House of
Representatives: Trying to Make Sense of the Nonsensical, Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.yuricare-
port.com/Law%20&%20Legal/AmarOnMarriageProtectionBill.html (calling the MPA
“utterly silly” because the language of the bill will not accomplish what the drafters
intend).
33. These states were not selected arbitrarily.  Massachusetts is the only state that
legally recognizes marriages between people of the same sex.  Arizona is one of many
that bans recognition of same-sex marriages and has no other law or policy for the
recognition of any other same-sex relationship.
34. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101(c) (2006), which provides that “[m]arriage be-
tween persons of the same sex is void and prohibited,” and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-112
(2006), which provides:
A. Marriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid in this
state, except marriages that are void and prohibited by section 25-101.
B. Marriages solemnized in another state or country by parties intending at
the time to reside in this state shall have the same legal consequences and
effect as if solemnized in this state, except marriages that are void and pro-
hibited by section 25-101.
C. Parties residing in this state may not evade the laws of this state relating
to marriage by going to another state or country for solemnization of the
marriage.
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ing that it violates the due process and equal protection guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The couple could also challenge
DOMA’s federal definition of marriage for the purposes of trying to
obtain benefits they claim are owed to them, as a married couple,
by the federal government.  While the court would not be pre-
vented from hearing the couple’s Fourteenth Amendment claim —
because the MPA does not bar federal courts from hearing such
claims — Arizona may counter that the couple’s second claim —
that DOMA’s definition of marriage is unconstitutional — is barred
from review by the MPA.  In addition, the federal court would be
prevented by the MPA from hearing any question related to, or in-
terpreting, DOMA.  The plaintiffs could, however, contest what ex-
actly is precluded by the MPA’s language preventing the litigation
of “questions pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity
under the Constitution of, section 1738C or this section.”35  As this
example illustrates, the MPA, at least on its face, does not seek to
preclude federal judicial review of the entire subject area of same-
sex marriage, in contrast to prior court-stripping bills such as the
Religious Freedom Restoration Action (RFRA).36
Unlike the MPA, the RFRA precluded the federal district
courts jurisdiction to “hear or determine any religious freedom-re-
lated case.”37  The legislation defined religious freedom broadly as
“any action in which any requirement, prohibition, or other provi-
sion relating to religious freedom that is contained in a State or
Federal statute is at issue.”38  By defining religious freedom so
35. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004) (emphasis added).  Surely, the “questions” that
potentially pertain to DOMA or the MPA would have to be identified by the court
before they could be rejected for lack of jurisdiction.  If, after those questions are dealt
with, the court determines that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the second issue — whether
DOMA does indeed preclude the right of the couple to receive federal benefits for
married people — the court maintains jurisdiction to hear the direct challenge to Ari-
zona’s definition of marriage and its prohibition on recognition of same-sex marriages
celebrated in other states.  Therefore, as this hypothetical illustrates, despite the far-
reaching language of the MPA, litigants may, in practice, have as much access to a
federal forum as they would without the MPA.  Challengers may, in fact, be encouraged
to bring constitutional claims that they might not otherwise have tried.
36. Numerous bills received substantial attention in the 1980s for restricting fed-
eral court jurisdiction over hot-button issues such as school prayer and abortion. See
sources cited supra note 8.
37. H.R. 1547, 108th Cong. (2004).
38. Id.
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broadly, the RFRA in turn precluded federal court review of a
broad category of cases.
Compared to the Pledge Protection Act (PPA), another court-
stripping bill, the MPA calls for a somewhat broader restriction on
federal judicial review.  The PPA, which has a similar legislative
structure to the MPA, would restrict the lower federal courts from
hearing, and the Supreme Court from reviewing, questions and in-
terpretations relating to the Pledge of Allegiance.39  Like the MPA,
the language of the PPA restricts review of the underlying Pledge
statute, not the Pledge of Allegiance itself.  Critically different, how-
ever, is that the PPA does not preclude review of itself; thus, a fed-
eral court could consider the constitutionality of the PPA, if not the
Pledge.  Unlike DOMA, the Pledge of Allegiance statute is purely
definitional — it merely recites the Pledge — and does not pre-
scribe a method of decisionmaking for questions that arise under
the statute.40  Litigants may therefore challenge the constitutional-
ity of the PPA in federal court without reaching substantive ques-
tions about the Pledge of Allegiance.  Under the MPA, federal
courts would lack jurisdiction to determine whether they have juris-
diction to hear cases or controversies that arise under the MPA.41
The federal courts, therefore, would not only be precluded from
39. H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004). The legislation states in relevant part:
No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any
question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Con-
stitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance, as defined in section 4 of title 4, or its
recitation. The limitation in this section shall not apply to the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia or the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.
Id.  The Pledge of Allegiance statute, referenced in the above-quoted text of the PPA,
provides the text of the pledge of allegiance along with protocol for its recitation. See 4
U.S.C. § 4 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-293, 116 Stat. 2057 (reaffirming the refer-
ence to “one Nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance).
40. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-293, 116 Stat. 2057.
41. This oft-described scenario, allowing jurisdiction to determine whether the
court has jurisdiction, provides breathing room for courts and litigants.  For example,
following passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 601(a), 110 Stat. 3009 (relevant provisions codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000)), which posed vast restrictions on judicial review of ques-
tions of law, federal courts maintain the ability to consider some questions of law. See
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that there would be serious constitutional
implications for a complete restriction of judicial review, and that without clear legisla-
tive language, the Court would not interpret IIRIRA to provide such a bar).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-3\NLR305.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-JUN-06 11:12
2005-2006] THE MPA: CONGRESSIONAL OVER-REACHING 821
considering the constitutionality of DOMA, but would also be una-
ble to assess the constitutionality of the MPA — the very statute that
divests them of jurisdiction.
III. CONGRESS LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO SIMULTANEOUSLY STRIP
THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS OF JURISDICTION AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OVER DOMA CLAIMS
The MPA would expressly prohibit any federal court from
hearing a challenge to a state’s recognition (or, more likely, lack of
recognition) of out-of-state, same-sex marriages under DOMA.  In
addition, the MPA provides that the Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction to review any such decision on appeal.  This section ad-
dresses whether Congress may constitutionally strip the lower fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction over DOMA questions, strip the Supreme
Court of appellate review, and do both simultaneously.  An analysis
of these questions reveals that Congress has the constitutional au-
thority to remove DOMA questions from either the original jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts or the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, but that it does not have the authority to do both
at the same time.  This section concludes that, in attempting to
eliminate both at the same time through the MPA, Congress is over-
reaching its constitutional authority.
A. Congress May Constitutionally Strip the Supreme Court of
Appellate Jurisdiction
In Section 2 of Article III, the Constitution defines the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  It provides that “the su-
preme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Con-
gress shall make.”42  This clause has been interpreted as granting
Congress broad authority to create exceptions to the Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction.43  The high-water mark of congressional authority
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
43. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (upholding the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act’s restriction on habeas appeals to the Supreme Court
from the circuit courts because petitioners could still file writs of habeas corpus directly
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 307 (1810) (holding that after the Judiciary Act of 1789, appellate jurisdic-
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to do so was expressed in Ex Parte McCardle, in which the Court
upheld an act of Congress that repealed the recently expanded ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear federal habeas
corpus appeals after the Civil War.44  Offering great deference to
the congressional authority derived from Article III, Chief Justice
Chase famously stated, “We are not at liberty to inquire into the
motives of the legislature.  We can only examine into its power
under the Constitution.”45  The Court was careful to note, however,
that the petitioner had an alternative avenue for judicial review be-
cause the Court could still hear the petitioner’s claim under the
1789 Judiciary Act.46  Compellingly, Professor Mickenberg argues
that McCardle and other cases of its time “merely established Con-
gress’s authority to impose procedural regulations on federal court
jurisdiction,” but did not preclude the courts from hearing cases in
controversial subjects.47
Since McCardle, the Court has upheld Congress’s authority to
restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a num-
ber of contexts.  In United States v. Klein, the Court struck down a
congressional statute that would require the Court to dismiss cer-
tain cases upon proof of a presidential pardon.48  The Court found
that “this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress
to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate
power . . . .  We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed
the limit which separates the legislative power from the judicial
power.”49  While Klein’s precedential value is debatable,50 Klein rec-
tion of the Supreme Court must be expressly conferred by statute); Wiscart v. D’Auchy,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (“If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our
proceedings, we cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we
cannot depart from it.”).
44. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
45. Id. at 514.
46. Id. at 515.
47. Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: Legislative Attempts
to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 497, 499 (1983).
48. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
49. Id. at 145-47.
50. See, e.g., Adam Cox, Symposium on New Directions in Federalism: Expressivism in
Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309
(2000) (discussing Klein in the context of Printz v. United States, which struck down pro-
visions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret
H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison and the Future of Antidiscrimination Law, 2000
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ognizes that although Congress has some power over the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, Congress may not attempt to direct
outcomes in certain cases because doing so usurps the judiciary’s
constitutional function of deciding cases and controversies.51
More recently, in Felker v. Turpin, the Court upheld the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which
prohibited Supreme Court review of U.S. Courts of Appeals rulings
on the writs of habeas corpus of state prisoners.52  The Court up-
held this restriction because Congress did not unconstitutionally
preclude state prisoners from bringing writs of habeas corpus di-
rectly to the Court under its original jurisdiction.53  This case fur-
ther demonstrates that Congress has the authority to restrict the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
These precedents provide ample support for the proposition
that Congress may strip the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction
over certain cases when an alternative forum for judicial review ex-
ists and when, in doing so, Congress does not infringe on the sepa-
ration of powers.54  In support of the MPA, the House Committee
SUP. CT. REV. 109, 127-29 (analyzing Klein in the context of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act); Lawrence Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J.
2525 (1998). Sager argues that:
This is how we should understand the first principle of United States v. Klein:
The judiciary will not allow itself to be made to speak and act against its
own best judgment on matters within its competence which have great con-
sequence for our political community. The judiciary will not permit its ar-
ticulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its actual
judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to support and
regularize that with which it in fact disagrees.
Id. at 2529.  Cf. Donald Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2537, 2538-49 (disagreeing with Sager’s analysis and arguing that “[m]uch that is said in
the opinion is exaggerated if not dead wrong,” and that the opinion should stand for
the proposition that “whatever the breadth of Congress’s power to regulate federal
court jurisdiction, it may not exercise that power in a way that requires a federal court
to act unconstitutionally”).
51. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 148.
52. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
53. Id. at 661-62.
54. See United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 400 (1908), holding that:
Except in cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and con-
suls and those in which a State shall be a party — in which cases this court
may exercise original jurisdiction — we can exercise appellate jurisdiction,
both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as
Congress shall make in the other cases to which by the Constitution the
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on the Judiciary relied on this line of cases for its authority to im-
pose statutory restrictions on the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court.55  Attempts by Congress to restrict the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction in the MPA do not reach the separation of
powers concerns raised in Klein because Congress’s restrictions are
not outcome-determinative.  The MPA would likely be upheld as a
constitutional preclusion of appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court — especially if it is construed to preclude statutory and not
solely constitutional challenges.56
B. Congress May Constitutionally Strip the Lower Federal Courts
of Original Jurisdiction
In Article III, Section 1, the Constitution provides that the “ju-
dicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”57  Congress’s power to create the lower
federal courts has been understood as implying the power to deter-
mine the jurisdiction of these courts.58  The Supreme Court held in
Sheldon v. Sill that Congress has the authority under Article III, Sec-
tion 1 to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.59  In
Sheldon, the Court upheld the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1789 that restricted diversity jurisdiction in the lower federal
judicial power of the United States extends.  What such exceptions and reg-
ulations should be it is for Congress, in its wisdom, to establish, having of
course due regard to all the provisions of the Constitution.
See also Mickenberg, supra note, 47 at 499 (citation omitted).
55. H.R. REP. NO. 108-614, at 14-16 (2004).
56. Although there are numerous constitutional claims that could be used to chal-
lenge the MPA.
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
58. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) (upholding provisions of the
Emergency Price Control Act, which precluded the lower federal courts from hearing
cases and conferred equity jurisdiction on the Emergency Court); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner
& Co. 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (upholding provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act that, inter
alia, prohibited the federal courts from issuing injunctions in certain labor disputes);
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922) (upholding Congress’s authority to
enact the Anti-Injunction Act, which reaffirmed Congress’s authority to confer and
withdraw in whole or part the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (upholding restrictions on diversity jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts imposed by Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789).
59. Sheldon, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 449.
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courts.60  The Court broadly held that “Congress, having the power
to establish the courts, must define their respective jurisdictions . . .
[and] Congress may withhold from any court of its creation juris-
diction of any of the enumerated controversies.  Courts created by
statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”61
Since Sheldon, Congress’s authority to define the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts has repeatedly been affirmed.  For example, in
Lockerty v. Phillips, the Court upheld Congress’s restriction on dis-
trict court jurisdiction over challenges to the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act 1942.62  There, the Court held that “[t]he Congressional
power to ordain and establish inferior federal courts includes the
power ‘of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concur-
rent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the
exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper
for the public good.’”63
There are numerous examples in which Congress has re-
stricted the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by precluding
the original jurisdiction of the district courts for the most common
forms of agency review.  For example, the Hobbs Act, provides that
petitions for judicial review of final agency actions shall go directly
to the circuit courts of appeals, rather than first going to the federal
district courts.64  That Act applies to many federal agencies, includ-
ing the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of
Agriculture, and the Department of Transportation.65
The MPA’s restriction on jurisdiction in the lower federal
courts reflects the broad authority by which Congress can affect the
original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.  Given the general
premise that some forum for resolution of federal issues must ex-
ist,66 litigants may still bring their claims in state courts, even if Con-
gress strips the lower federal courts of jurisdiction over questions
and interpretations of DOMA and the MPA.  Therefore, as long as
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction permits the Court’s re-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
63. Id. at 187 (citing Cary v. Curtis 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845)).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2000).
65. See id.
66. See cases discussed supra Section III.A.
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view of state court rulings in such cases, the constitutional authority
of Congress to preclude lower court jurisdiction would likely be
upheld.67
C. Congress May Not Simultaneously Strip Both the Original
Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Over
Constitutional Questions
Congress’s power to preclude all federal review of a category of
cases in both the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts has never been
exercised.68  Its authority to do so remains a question.  To date, this
issue has played out primarily in theoretical interpretations of Arti-
cle III.  In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story analyzed Article III
and identified two classes of cases — cases arising under federal law
and controversies in which the United States is a party.69  Justice Story
argued that the constitution mandates a federal forum for all cases
arising under federal law:
In respect to the first class, it may well have been the in-
tention of the framers of the constitution imperatively to
extend the judicial power either in an original or appel-
late form to all cases; and in the latter class to leave it to
congress to qualify the jurisdiction, original or appellate,
in such manner as public policy might dictate.70
67. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 515, stating that:
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act in
question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas
corpus, is denied.  But this is an error.  The act of 1868 does not except
from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the
act of 1867.  It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously
exercised.
68. See supra note 9.
69. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333-34 (1816).
70. Id. at 334.  See also, Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act
Of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (praising Justice Story and further explaining the two-
tiered structure of Article III ); cf. John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 CHI. L. REV. 203 (1997) (taking issue
with Amar’s history and textual analysis of Article III and providing a textual criticism of
the “mandatory” reading of the Extending Clause and Amar’s division between
mandatory and permissive tiers of jurisdictional categories).
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According to Story’s interpretation of Article III, therefore, cases
arising under federal law require a federal forum71 and, accord-
ingly, must be heard in either a lower federal court or the Supreme
Court.
Other than analyses of Article III in dicta, the Court has
avoided passing judgment on the constitutionality of Congressional
legislation that precludes all federal court review of constitutional
claims.72  The Supreme Court is not inclined to recognize the au-
thority of Congress to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
constitutional claims, generally finding that although Article III au-
thorizes Congress to be the gatekeepers to the federal courts, it
does not authorize Congress to preclude review of the other provi-
sions of the Constitution.73
For example, in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., the Second
Circuit considered a federal statute that precluded all judicial re-
71. This argument rests solely on the fundamental structure and language of Arti-
cle III.  It is consistent, however, with arguments that the state courts alone do not
provide adequate judicial review of constitutional questions, such as those raised by the
MPA.  Federal judges, who typically bring prestige, experience and expertise in federal
law to the bench, and who do not face the electoral pressures that many state court
judges do, are in a better position to address questions of federal law and constitutional
interpretation.  For a sample of the nearly three decades of scholarship debating the
parity of state and federal courts, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsid-
ered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Erwin Chemer-
insky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U.L. REV. 593 (1991); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judi-
cial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797 (1995); William B. Rubenstein, The Myth
of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMM. 599 (1999).
72. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (holding that there would be serious constitu-
tional implications for a complete restriction of judicial review, and that without clear
legislative language, the Court would not interpret IIRIRA to provide such a bar); Web-
ster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (finding that judicial review was available for claims
brought by a CIA employee who alleged that he was fired because he was gay); Johnson
v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (interpreting the Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act
of 1966 as to not preclude review of Veteran Administration decisions that could raise
equal protection challenges).
73. See supra note 72.  This is a period in which this long-prevailing view will be
tested.  For example, on May 11, 2005, Congress enacted the Real ID Act, Pub. L. No.
109-13, 119 Stat. 302, which expressly precludes federal court review of all statutory and
constitutional habeas corpus challenges.  The Court has not yet ruled on whether these
provisions violate the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, and whether Congress has the
authority to preclude review of the Constitutional claim to habeas corpus. See Gerald
Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review after the Real ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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view.74  There, the court considered Congress’s attempt through
the Portal-to-Portal Act to prevent all courts — federal and state —
from hearing claims against employers for retroactive back pay.75
The court did not reach the constitutionality of jurisdiction limiting
legislation that put constitutional rights at stake.  On the merits of
Battaglia’s claim, the court found that the back-pay at issue in the
case did not constitute a property interest under the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause.  The court stated in dicta, however, that
“the exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject
to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amend-
ment.”76  Although Congress has broad authority to restrict the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts, it may not, in doing so, violate the
other provisions of the Constitution.
While Battaglia was a circuit court opinion, such reasoning is
reflected in later Supreme Court cases.  For example, in Webster v.
Doe the Court found that Congress had the authority to strip federal
courts of jurisdiction over statutory rights.77  Congress must, how-
ever, provide clear intent to deprive review of constitutional
claims.78  Doe alleged that the CIA’s termination of his employ-
ment violated section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure
Act and deprived him of his constitutionally protected rights, in-
cluding due process, equal protection, and privacy.79  The Court
wanted to avoid a “serious constitutional question that would arise
if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim.”80  The Court therefore did not con-
strue the statute to preclude review of constitutional claims.81
More recently, in INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court considered
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA),82 which denied immigrants the right to federal judicial
74. 169 F.2d. 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
75.  Id. at 259.
76. Id. at 257.
77. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
78. Id. at 603.
79. Id. at 596.
80. Id. at 603 (internal quotations omitted).
81. Id.
82. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 601(a), 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).  The relevant jurisdiction stripping provisions of IIRIRA are codi-
fied in 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  For further discussion of the IIRIRA, see Lenni B. Benson, Back
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review of adverse agency decisions.83  The government argued that
Congress acted within its authority by eliminating the federal
courts’ jurisdiction over habeas petitions seeking review of deporta-
tion proceedings.84  Disagreeing, the Court held that
If it were clear that the question of law could be answered
in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to ac-
cept [the government’s argument].  But the absence of
such a forum, coupled with the lack of a clear, unambigu-
ous, and express statement of congressional intent to pre-
clude judicial consideration on habeas of such an
important question of law, strongly counsels against
adopting a construction that would raise serious constitu-
tional questions.85
The MPA attempts to preclude all federal review of “any ques-
tion pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the
Constitution of [DOMA] or [the MPA].”86  The MPA expressly pre-
vents gay people from exerting their right to seek review of what
they deem to be a violation of their federal constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection, with the practical implication
that they, and those affected by their marriage, may not bring a
constitutional challenge of a state’s refusal to recognize their out-of-
state marriages in federal court.  Certainly both DOMA87 and the
MPA would be challenged on numerous constitutional grounds;
to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29
CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997).  The perverse result of the 1996 IIRIRA court-stripping,
combined with restrictive regulations in the Board of Immigration Appeals, was a 970%
increase in the number of cases in the courts of appeals challenging orders of removal.
See Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and The Ad-
ministrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006); John Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV (forthcoming 2006).
83. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292.
84. Id. at 298.
85. Id. at 314.  It should be noted that unlike litigation under IIRIRA, challenges
to DOMA could still take place in state courts, which have general jurisdiction to hear
federal constitutional claims.  The MPA, therefore, may not raise the extreme constitu-
tional issue raised by a potential complete prohibition on any judicial review.
86. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
87. Of course, it is worth noting that if DOMA is struck down as unconstitutional,
legislation preventing litigation under the statute in federal court would obviously be
unnecessary.
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due process and equal protection challenges appear to be the most
immediate strategies.  While the Court has never expressly held that
Congress may not strip judicial review of constitutional rights, the
cases discussed above indicate the Court’s presumption against
preclusions of judicial review of constitutional questions.  Because
the MPA precludes review of such challenges, it would not with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Tribe aptly assessed a prior era of congressional
court-stripping attempts: “In truth, of course, no interest in the ar-
cane of jurisdiction as such lies behind the proposed bills; their pro-
ponents have, without exception, fastened on jurisdiction only as a
means to an end.”88  The MPA is no exception.  The legislation is
not projected to endure the scrutiny of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, and its effectiveness is questionable.  The MPA raises novel
concerns about the authority of Congress to preclude all federal
review of a constitutional question.  By attempting to remove all
federal court jurisdiction, both in the original jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, the MPA pushes the limits of Article III.  It does so, not with
a procedural purpose, but with a substantive agenda that is discrimi-
natory and jeopardizes the rights of gay and lesbian couples.89  If
88. Laurence Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the
Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 130 (1981).
89. The Committee Report drafters expressed an intention that “H.R. 3313 is mo-
tivated by a desire to preserve for the states the authority to decide whether the shield
Congress enacted to protect them from having to accept same-sex marriage licenses
issued out of state will hold — not by any ill will or animus.” H.R. REP. NO. 108-614, at
18 (2004).  Here, the drafters are distinguishing the MPA from the Colorado statute in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995), which provided that sexual orientation should not
be treated like race.  The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional,
finding no rational basis for treating homosexuals as a suspect class.  Id. at 635.  In
Romer, the “sheer breadth [of the statute was] so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”  Id. at 632.  Drawing
lines across classes of people rather than merely distinguishing between classes of cases
certainly requires a judicial scrutiny that demands at least a rational basis of the legisla-
ture. See id. at 632-33 (“A law that disparately treats an affected class is presumptively
constitutional and will be upheld if the classification rationally furthers a legitimate
state interest.”).  Animus, however, is not a rational basis.  Id. at 632.  Although the
drafters of the MPA purport to restrict federal judicial review over a class of cases (state
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enacted, the MPA would be a significant overreaching of congres-
sional authority that would profoundly disturb the separation of
powers.  MPA-opponent John Lewis was right when he said that, “As
emotionally charged and politicized as the issue of same sex mar-
riage has become, we should not use that controversy to damage
permanently the courts, the Constitution, and the Congress.”90
marriage policy), gay and lesbian couples would necessarily be disproportionately af-
fected by the law.  To suggest otherwise, is akin to suggesting that cases about preg-
nancy are not about women. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that a
rational basis test should apply to an equal protection analysis in a pregnancy discrimi-
nation employment case because the policy discriminated against pregnant people not
women).  In a floor statement, MPA-opponent, Representative Edward Markey pro-
claimed, “While every other American will continue to enjoy the checks and balances
that come from three branches of government, the Republicans have decided that if
you are gay, you should be able to get along with just two branches of government!”
150 Cong. Rec. H6567 (daily ed. July 22, 2004).
90. Conyers, supra note 9, at 38.
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